Pity President Lee Myung-bak, who has fallen on hard times. After riding a strong wave of voter support into office, he began his five-year term in late February full of confidence, energy and big plans befitting Korea’s first “CEO President.” Leading his country’s conservative party back into power after their decade in the political wilderness, Mr. Lee moved quickly to toughen the South’s policy towards Pyongyang, lay out an ambitious economic growth agenda, call for a shake-up of Korea’s English-language education system, propose building a “grand canal” linking Korea’s major rivers, and put strengthening frayed relations with the United States at the top of his foreign-policy agenda.

It did not take long, however, for Mr. Lee to see his plans begin to unravel in the face of a stark response from North Korea, a U.S. eager to cut a deal with Pyongyang before President George W. Bush leaves office, an international economic downturn, popular resentment of Mr. Lee’s assertive leadership style, and a media-fed nationwide panic over imported American beef. Today, a chastened President Lee has had to trim his sails. Circumstances—and a loud public outcry—have compelled the president to twice seek forgiveness in nationwide speeches and to promise a “new beginning” in his approach to governing. Reflecting this new approach, the rhetoric aimed at the North has been less strident. Mr. Lee has also reached out to rival conservative leaders for support, replaced most of his senior advisors (with a cabinet reshuffle to follow), and shelved some of his pet projects, including the unpopular canal proposal.

Meanwhile, Washington has been eyeing these developments with a mixture of alarm and sympathy. The Bush administration was clearly delighted with Mr. Lee’s election, which brought into office Korea’s first conservative president in a decade—a period during which Washington and Seoul often did not see eye to eye on North Korea policy. Mr. Lee was seen as a welcome change from his predecessor, Roh Moo-hyun, who had frequently irritated the U.S. with left-leaning or populist rhetoric and his tendency to wax sympathetic toward North Korea.

Mr. Lee’s emphasis on “restoring” good relations with the United States was greeted with enthusiasm in Washington, which saw an opportunity to enlist a kindred soul in building a more comprehensive, even global U.S.-South Korea partnership, including a new free trade agreement that would bring significant benefits to both countries. The stars seemed well aligned for both the U.S. and South Korea to launch a new era of closer, more harmonious cooperation. No wonder, then, that during Mr. Lee’s initial visit to Washington in April, President Bush feted him at the Camp David presidential retreat—the first time a Korean president had ever been hosted there.

However, Mr. Lee’s recent domestic troubles have weakened him in the eyes of many in Washington and raised questions among some that he could become a lame duck after only a few months in office. The angry protests over American beef and the demonstrators’ calls for Mr. Lee to step down raised the dual concern that not only would Washington’s hopes for a stronger bilateral partnership be dashed but that, as so often in the past, relations with the United States would become the focus of popular protest in Korea.

Such concerns undoubtedly contributed to the Bush administration’s decision to show flexibility in response to Seoul’s request that the United States “renegotiate” a bilateral agreement to reopen Korea’s market to U.S. beef. That agreement was perceived by some Koreans as an infringement on Korea’s sovereignty and as overly concessionary to the U.S. In the end, Washington conceded to a workaround (carefully avoiding the word “renegotiation”) that called for American beef exporters, with Washington’s blessing, to limit beef shipments to Korea to cattle less than 30 months of age, a cutoff which Korea claimed reduced the possibility that the beef could be contaminated with mad cow disease.

It remains to be seen whether the American concession, prompted by a U.S. desire to bolster the South Korean president by placating angry Korean consumers, will calm the streets of Seoul. The size of demonstrations has decreased, but protesters, perhaps out of desperation, are showing an increased willingness to resort to violence. How President Lee responds to this challenge and whether and how he manages to restore public confidence in his presidency will bear watching.

Washington will be watching particularly closely. Hopes for a closer, enhanced bilateral partnership with Seoul remain strong. Realizing such hopes depends on having a strong, willing partner in the Blue House. Washington’s hopes are far from unreasonable. For all Mr. Lee’s troubles, his term of office, and the imminent election of a new U.S. president, offer both countries an important chance to put behind them a decade of bilateral strain and tension, strengthen their alliance, and transform it into a global partnership.

Significantly, Mr. Lee’s tenure will coincide with the entire first term of the next American president. Together, the two new leaders could revitalize an alliance partnership that remains central to both countries’ interests and key to stability in Northeast Asia. For the U.S., South Korea is a valued partner in its effort to encourage the People’s Republic of China’s development as a responsible stakeholder in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. Washington realizes that without close U.S.-South Korean cooperation, efforts to resolve the North Korea nuclear crisis stand no chance of success. Working with its two Northeast Asian allies, Korea and Japan, enhances the United States’ ability to keep the peace, deal with regional uncertainties, and project its influence. For the United States, South Korea’s phenomenal economic and political development also makes it a model of the virtues of a market economy and democracy that Americans are keen to promote.

Most Koreans, despite their noted sensitivity to real or perceived slights by Washington (viz., the beef issue) and their occasional differences with the U.S. over North Korea, continue to believe that strong security links with America are essential. For Korea, the guarantees provided by a security relationship with the U.S. represent the best “insurance policy” for its survival as a strong and independent state that Korea has ever enjoyed.

The key to securing the support of most Koreans for a closer, stronger relationship with the U.S. lies in the policies that Washington elects to pursue. South Koreans will be more inclined to support the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond if it pursues policies that promote stability, peace, prosperity, and democratic values, and if these policies are crafted in consultation with its Korean ally. Koreans want to feel that they are respected, full partners in their relationship with the U.S. Achieving such a balance in U.S.-South Korea ties should be a major priority for the next U.S. president, on whose watch the major work of recasting the bilateral relationship will take place.

Looking at the Northeast Asia region, the Lee administration seems rightly determined to pursue better relations with its Chinese, Japanese, and Russian neighbors. Nevertheless, Koreans are unsettled by the uncertain strategic future of their neighborhood. Seoul’s worries include North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons, the impact of a rising China, perceptions of a militarily stronger Japan, the continuing Sino-Japanese rivalry, and Russia’s more strident foreign policy. These uncertainties provide plenty of fuel for South Koreans’ interest in exploring an enhanced partnership with the U.S.

For most of its 60-year history, South Korea had not reached the level of economic and political development that would enable it to engage in a globalized partnership with the U.S. Today, Korea has not only the capability but also the will to do so, and this presents Washington with a major opportunity.
However, both the U.S. and South Korea will need to make some adjustments to realize a more globalized partnership. The next U.S. administration will have to include South Korea more fully in its foreign policy consultations, as befits the country’s status as a major ally and leading global economy. South Korea, for its part, needs to move beyond lingering feelings of being a victim of foreign powers, including the U.S.

Some South Koreans believe that the U.S. regards the concept of a global partnership as a means of pressing their country to support and pay for U.S. foreign policy, like it or not. The next American president needs to take South Korean interests and concerns fully into account. For their part, South Korean leaders need to take responsibility for explaining and defending the alliance to their own citizens, something that they have often failed to do in the past.

For the next U.S. president, reconciling differences with Seoul on North Korea will continue to be an important and occasionally difficult task. Some in the South Korean government may suspect that, in the interest of reaching an accommodation with North Korea, the U.S. might accept less than full verification of that regime’s abandonment of nuclear weapons, or might even allow the North to retain some of its nuclear weapons once Pyongyang’s fissile material production capacity had been eliminated. Although President Lee’s administration may have learned an important lesson about the downside of pursuing a too-strident line with Pyongyang, its conservative bent will continue to make it averse to supporting a U.S. approach toward Pyongyang that is seen as too accommodating.

Patience, careful, and close consultation, as well as flexibility by Washington, will be central to managing these concerns. In dealing with his South Korean counterpart, the next U.S. president would also do well to recall the frictions and setbacks that have arisen when American and South Korean policies toward North Korea work at cross purposes. The disconnect on North Korea that characterized the Bush administration’s relations with former Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun is an experience that the next U.S. president would do well to remember.

As the U.S. and Korean presidents seek to build a more comprehensive alliance and broader partnership, they should begin by launching a dialogue that defines the two nations’ common global interests more clearly. There is no dearth of issues on which the two can consult, including energy and the environment, where both countries have a strong interest in promoting energy efficiency in parallel with the Kyoto dialogue on climate change.

Bilateral discussions could also include a shared strategic approach to development assistance, coordinating the distribution of U.S. and Korean official development assistance in sensitive areas such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Southeast Asia.

Keeping in mind South Korean concerns about the uncertain future of Northeast Asia, the U.S. needs to give increased emphasis to the foreign minister-level strategic dialogue launched in 2006. The dialogue should focus on the broad strategic environment and the possibilities for common approaches to regional and global security and other issues. The aim should be to build the U.S.-South Korea alliance into a global partnership whose common interests include but go beyond the deterrence of potential North Korean aggression.

The next U.S. administration also has an opportunity to revive trilateral coordination with Japan, not only regarding North Korea but, perhaps more importantly, as a broader dialogue on issues such as energy, climate, and development. U.S.-South Korea and U.S.-Japan security cooperation are also appropriate subjects for this kind of trilateral consultation, since the security of all three is closely linked.

The consolidation and rationalization of the U.S. military base presence in Korea has been a difficult and complex issue in the past. Implementing the agreements to reduce the profile and the “footprint” of U.S. military bases in Korea, particularly in urban areas, should remain a priority for Washington and Seoul. Doing so will reduce the likelihood of training-related incidents such as the tragic deaths of two schoolgirls in 2002, which led to a major outburst of anti-American sentiment in Korea. It will also lessen the chance that U.S. bases and base issues will become a political lightning rod for protesters.

However, the next U.S. president should take care to avoid making any cuts or significant changes to the deployment of U.S. military forces that could be perceived in the South as a lessening of America’s security commitment to Korea. The message to South Korea—and to the North—should be clear: The U.S. will defend its ally and deter any aggression. In this connection, it will also be critical to convey America’s willingness to listen carefully to South Korea’s concerns about the potential impact in Korea of the ongoing shift from a U.S.-led to a U.S.-supported wartime command structure.

Finally, as the U.S. and South Korea seek to revitalize, modernize, and broaden their bilateral alliance partnership, the role of the recently negotiated but still unratified U.S.-South Korea FTA looms large. Beyond providing a major boost to both economies, the FTA would add an important new dimension to a bilateral alliance that has primarily (albeit with good reason) focused on deterring North Korea.

As the world’s 12th largest economy and America’s seventh-largest trading partner, South Korea’s status as a major international economic force and a vital economic partner deserves to be recognized. South Korea, as a demonstration of its commitment to free trade, should open its doors further to U.S. products and investment.

With the dispute of imports of American beef (hopefully) on its way to a permanent resolution, both Korea’s National Assembly and the U.S. Congress should act as quickly as they can to ratify the FTA. However, both sides should be prepared to recognize that the damage done by the recent beef dispute and the questions raised about the FTA during the current American presidential campaign may make it difficult, if not impossible, to secure FTA ratification until 2009. Both sides should be patient, and avoid putting the agreement at risk by moving too quickly to bring it to a vote that could fail. In light of the major benefits that the agreement will ultimately bring, it would be better to have it ratified late than not at all.

For the U.S., South Korea has been a good and trusted ally, even if Korean nationalism, emotionalism, and sensitivity have occasionally tried Washington’s patience. For South Korea, living in a dangerous neighborhood has put a premium on the value of the “insurance” that a good relationship with Washington provides. Recognizing these simple truths will be a good starting point for the Korean and U.S. presidents as they begin work next year on building a robust, modern, and comprehensive partnership between their two countries.

Mr. Revere is president of The Korea Society in New York. The Korea Society and Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center are leading the “New Beginnings” project dedicated to strengthening U.S.-R.O.K. relations. While this article is based on some of the recommendations of that project, the views expressed are those of the author.