Between Bush and Bin Laden

Posted July 24, 2008 

These days, challenges to Pakistan’s sovereignty and security come from friends and foes alike. Even as Pakistan faces escalating militant violence within its borders, U.S. policy makers have threatened “hot pursuit” of militants into the tribal belt. At this critical juncture, the U.S. approach should be to strengthen Pakistan’s capacity to combat violent extremism instead of engaging in words and actions that could further destabilize the country and region.

On July 23, leaders of Pakistan’s ruling coalition met to develop a consensus-based approach to rising violence in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the North West Frontier Province. While they extended authority to paramilitary groups to use “full force” against militants, the coalition partners emphasized dialogue as the preferred approach to militant groups, with force to be used only as a last resort.

Recent negotiations between the newly elected government and the Tehreek-e-Taliban (Taliban Movement of Pakistan) fell into disarray when the government launched military operations against two rival, sectarian groups in the strategic Khyber agency. The operation ended inconclusively with many Pakistanis believing that it was launched superficially to mollify U.S. concerns.

In recent weeks, U.S. and NATO dissatisfaction with negotiations resulted in a series of unfortunate events along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Drone strikes in Mohmand and Bajaur agencies killed Pakistani soldiers and civilians, resulting in calls for revenge against the United States and retaliatory attacks within Pakistan’s settled areas.

While U.S. concerns about negotiating with the Taliban remain valid -- the past couple of months saw American casualties in Afghanistan exceed those in Iraq -- it is important for the United States to understand that the priority of the Pakistani government should be to first bring peace and stability within its own borders. If it is seen to place the interests of the United States before its own, it will experience the same legitimacy problems Gen. Pervez Musharraf faced. This will undermine Pakistan's democratic transition and create instability—outcomes that do not bode well for either peace in the region nor U.S. security interests.

In addition, the support of Pakistan’s population is vital in the fight against extremism. A recent Terror Free Tomorrow poll suggested that a majority of Pakistanis favor negotiations and dialogue over use of force in the government’s dealing with militant groups. If negotiations fail because of militant recalcitrance, Pakistanis will support the use of force knowing all other channels were exhausted. This will lead to greater public ownership of the fight against extremism, something the United States has called for.

So how can the U.S support Pakistan’s efforts at combating extremism and also preserve its security interests in the region?

First, America should help the talks succeed. Before Tehreek-e-Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud suspended talks, the United States had worked with the government to bolster the peace agreements by adding several clauses. These called on the Taliban to refrain from cross-border attacks and to hand over foreign militants to the government within a two month time-frame. This was a move in the right direction -- the U.S. approach should be to reinforce agreements that seem to be working (the Swat peace agreement remains intact) and provide expertise to improve the government’s monitoring and enforcement capacities, thus creating institutional mechanisms to fight extremism over the long term.

Second, the United States should call for improved lines of communication between Pakistan’s federal and provincial negotiating teams, which previously lacked a coherent strategy. The federal government had mostly excluded the provincial government from talks with militants in FATA. Thus, the provincial government could not hold TTP members in the Frontier accountable if violations occurred by their counterparts in the tribal belt. This led one official to observe that while the TTP have a unified command structure across FATA and the NWFP, the government appeared divided, giving the militants an edge.

Third, funding and technical assistance to the $4 billion peace plan developed by the ANP-led NWFP government could help reduce militancy. The multidimensional plan seeks to expand the police force and constabulary by 14,000 men. U.S. training to professionalize the force could be vital to security in the province and would enable the effective implementation of the Swat peace agreement.

The legal, economic and political integration of FATA into the Frontier province is also essential. The provincial government has emphatically called for the amendment of the draconian Frontier Crimes Regulation and extension of the Political Parties Act. The United States should actively support the proposals.

This is a critical time for Pakistan as it pursues a homegrown strategy to fight extremism. Rather than undermine the approach, the United States would do well to bolster it in a way that would serve its long-term security interests in both Pakistan and the region.

Ms. Mehlaqa Samdani is an advisor to the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC.